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POVERTY LAW IN ONTARIO:
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
Randall Ellsworth and Ian Morrison*
RESUME
Cet article fait la revue des 6v~nements de l'ann~e derni~re dans certains
domaines de la defense juridique des personnes faible revenu, y compris
l'aide sociale, les accidents du travail, l'assurance-ch6mage et le R6gime de
pensions du Canada. Nous nous concentrons sur la r~forme de la loi, sur les
litiges et sur la pertinence de ces activit~s aux yeux de ceux et celles qui
pratiquent ce domaine du droit. Nous consid6rons les effets de la recession
et les actes des gouvernements f6dral et provincial dans les secteurs
s~lectionn~s. Nous font l'analyse de la jurisprudence de la Cour supreme du
Canada au sujet du droit des tribunaux administratifs de statuer sur la Charte
canadienne des droits et liberts. Nous examinons ce sujet dans le contexte
des tribunaux et des secteurs juridiques s~lectionn6s.
INTRODUCTION
This article is intended to provide an overview of developments of the past
year in some of the key areas of poverty law practice in Ontario. As always,
it is difficult to draw the boundaries for an examination of this sort. The low
income community is obviously not affected only by the areas of law usually
meant when the phrase "poverty law" is invoked; indeed, the labels we use
to divide our substantive law interests are generally more important for the
bureaucratic structures of the system within which we practice than for
clients.
Copyright © 1991 Randall Ellsworth and Ian Morrison. Randall Ellsworth is a research
lawyer with the Clinic Resource Office of the Ontario Legal Plan (CRO). Ian Morrison
is a research lawyer and Executive Director of the CRO. The CRO has been in opera-
tion since January 1991; it provides legal research and resource and training materials
to practitioners in Ontario community legal clinics. The CRO's mandate is currently
restricted to income maintenance law as it applies to the low income community in On-
tario served by community clinics. The authors would like to acknowledge the assis-
tance of the many people both within and outside the clinic system who provided
information for this article.
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Nevertheless, time and space constraints have meant that some limits had to be
placed on the scope of this project. The article will therefore focus specifically
on advocacy issues in respect of the federal and provincial income maintenance
programs-social assistance, workers' compensation, unemployment insurance
and Canada Pensions-which make up the core of income maintenance practice
in the Ontario community legal clinic system. While it must be admitted that the
most important factor in this decision was the particular knowledge and expertise
of the authors, we also think it appropriate, at a time when so many Ontario
citizens are unemployed or facing unemployment due to the recession and the
consequences of the so-called "restructuring" of the economy, to focus on the
problems of income maintenance-and what advocates have done and may be
able to do in this area.
We would also like to note that we have focussed on litigation issues,
although we discuss important legislative developments and law reform
issues as well. Again, we were compelled by time and space constraints to
limit what could be covered here. We would not want to be taken as
minimizing in any way the community development and organization work
which is such an important part of the work of the mandate of the community
clinic movement. We hope that if there are to be future articles on this topic
in the Journal, it will be possible to cover this area more fully.
1. POVERTY LAW AND THE CHARTER
There have been a number of Charter cases of relevance to poverty law
practice in the past year.1 Substantive decisions in the areas covered by this
article will be considered in the discussions of those areas. However, there
have also been a number of cases with general practice implications. These
are discussed in this section.
JURISDICTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
In a trilogy of cases the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with delineating
the scope of an administrative tribunal's jurisdiction to hear and determine
Charter issues. In Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College,
2
Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board)3 and Tetreault-
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982 c.11 [hereinafter the Charter].
2. DouglaslKwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College (1990), 77 D.LR. (4th) 94 (S.C.C.).
3. Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), (June 6, 1991), File No.
21675 (S.C.C.) [unreported].
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Gadoury v. Canada (Canada Employment And Immigration Commission)4
the Court attempted (though never unanimously) to provide some general
guidelines to what has been a perplexing problem. The resolution of some of
these issues is of particular relevance to poverty law practitioners, much of
whose practice consists of appearances before such administrative tribunals
where Charter arguments can be raised.
At issue in Douglas College, the first of the cases decided by the Supreme
Court, was whether a provision of a collective agreement between an agent
of the Crown (the college) and the faculty association which required the
employees to retire at age 65 violated the equality provisions of the Charter.
A preliminary issue, and the one the Supreme Court was called upon to
address, was the jurisdiction of an arbitration board appointed by the parties
to resolve this grievance disputing the constitutionality of the provision.
However, while the parties in Douglas College raised the jurisdictional issue
in the terms of section 24(1) of the Charter,5 and section 52 of the Constitu-
tionAct, 1982,6 the Court only answered the question in the context of section
52(1).
Mr. Justice La Forest wrote for the majority 7 and he drew a distinction
between the exercise of the power conferred by section 24(1) of the Charter
and the duty of a tribunal to apply the Constitution in the course of performing
its statutory mandate. After having thoroughly reviewed the somewhat con-
flicting caselaw of the lower courts on this issue, he reasoned that where a
tribunal "was engaged in performing what it was by law empowered to do
... it was entitled not only to construe the relevant legislation but to determine
whether that legislation was validly enacted". 8 Noting that a tribunal must
4. Tetreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission),
(June 6,1991), File No. 21222 (S.C.C.) [unreported].
5. That section provides:
24(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been in-
fringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such
remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
6. That section provides:
52(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsis-
tency, of no force or effect.
7. Dickson C.J.C. and Gonthier J. concurring, Sopinka J. and Cory J. concurring on this
point.
8. Supra, note 1 at 117.
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respect the 'supreme law of the land', La Forest J. concluded that if a tribunal
finds a law it is called upon to apply to be invalid, it is bound to treat it as
having no force or effect.9
However, La Forest J. also noted that where a tribunal is called upon to
determine whether Charter rights have been infringed or to grant a remedy
under section 24(1) of the Charter, then the tribunal's power is limited to
exercising its statutory mandate. He stated:
... the jurisdiction of a statutory tribunal must be found in a statute and must
extend not only to the subject matter of the application and the parties, but
also to the remedy sought. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, it can in the
exercise of its mandate find a statute invalid under the Charter.
10
In the result in Douglas College, La Forest J. found the arbitration board
could, pursuant to its mandate, consider the constitutional validity of the
provision in the collective agreement. It had jurisdiction over the parties by
virtue of the collective agreement and the Labour Code.11 Aswell, the board
had jurisdiction over the subject matter because under section 98 of the
Labour Code, the board was empowered to interpret and apply any Act
intended to regulate employment, which La Forest J. concluded included the
Charter. Finally, the Labour Code also provided the authority for the ar-
bitrator to grant the appropriate remedies in the case.
To some extent, La Forest J. clarified his reasoning in Douglas College in the
subsequent case of Cuddy Chicks. In that case the union had filed an
application for certification with the Ontario Labour Relations Board. How-
ever, the company argued that the Labour Relations Act 12 specifically ex-
cluded the employees in question. In response the union argued that if the
Act did not apply to the employees then the Act infringed their freedom of
association and equality rights under the Charter. At the instance of the
company the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Board did have
the jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of its enabling statute.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. at 118.
11. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212.
12. R.S.O. 1980, c. 228.
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Two passages from Mr. Justice La Forest's majority judgment 13 are sufficient
to outline the analysis in such cases. He reiterated the Court's holding in
Douglas College stating:
... this Court articulated the basic principle that an administrative tribunal
which has been conferred the power to interpret law holds a concomitant
power to determine whether that law is constitutionally valid.
14
He stated further,
... s. 52(1) does not specify which bodies may consider and rule on Charter
questions, and cannot be said to confer jurisdiction on an administrative
tribunal. Rather, jurisdiction must have expressly or impliedly been con-
ferred on the tribunal by its enabling statute or otherwise. This fundamental
principle holds true regardless of the nature of the issue before the ad-
ministrative body. Thus, a tribunal prepared to address a Charter issue must
already have jurisdiction over the whole of the matter before it, namely, the
parties, subject matter and remedy sought. 15
In both Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks the court gave consideration to
the reasons which have been expounded for and against imposing the juris-
diction to make Charter findings upon administrative tribunals. 16 It was
noted that to do so may actually be contrary to one of the prime reasons for
the existence of such tribunals; speedy and inexpensive decision-making. As
well, not all tribunals are of the same calibre (i.e., they include both lawyers
and/or lay persons) and there is no guarantee of the independence of the
decision-makers. More importantly it was feared that the surfeit of evidence
which would be necessary in most Charter cases could not be marshalled by
most litigants who appeared before administrative tribunals, resulting in an
incomplete or deficient record before both the tribunal and the courts on
review. Finally, the absence of any role for the Attorney-General before most
tribunals was seen as an obstacle to any effective Charter resolution.
However, Mr. Justice La Forest noted that tribunals had in the past been
involved in determining constitutional questions, especially in the context of
their own jurisdictions, and he saw no reason why they should not be able to
consider other constitutional issues. His primary concern was that the Con-
13. Lamer CJ.C., Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin and Stevenson JJ, concurring.
14. Supra, note 2 at 9.
15. Ibid. at 9-10.
16. For the discussion of these issues see Douglas College, supra, note 1 at 121-126 and
Cuddy Chicks, supra, note 2 at 11-13.
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stitution must be respected and that tribunals should not be called upon to
apply unconstitutional legislation. Tribunals which are called upon to make
governmental decisions should focus upon the values enshrined in the
Charter. He reasoned also that there could be an advantage in making use of
the expertise of the various tribunals in compiling the record to be used in
constitutional interpretation. As was stated in Cuddy Chicks "the ability of
the decision-maker to analyze competing policy concerns is critical".
17
Finally, he thought that it was an advantage to a person to have the matter
raised at an early stage in the regulatory process, without having to resort to
the more costly and time consuming court process.
Mr. Justice LaForest made two very important caveats to his reasoning in
Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks. The first was that no curial deference would
be displayed to a tribunal with respect to its constitutional decisions, as they are
not there acting within the limits of their expertise.18 The second was that a
tribunal could not give a formal declaration of invalidity. Instead the tribunal
... simply treats any impugned provision as invalid for the purposes of the
matter before it. Given that this is not tantamount to a formal declaration of
invalidity, a remedy only exercisable by the superior courts, the ruling of the
Board on a Charter issue does not constitute a binding legal precedent, but is
limited in its applicability to the matter in which it arises.'
9
The final case of the Supreme Court's trilogy is Tetreault-Gadoury, a case
which is of interest to poverty law advocates for several reasons. For present
purposes, the focus will be on the Court's jurisdictional analysis 20 and its
extension of the principles outlined in Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks.
In Tetreault-Gadoury the respondent had lost her job shortly after turning 65
years of age. She had applied for benefits under the Unemployment Insurance
Act21 but, because the Act at that time prohibited the payment of benefits to
persons over the age of 65, she had been denied. She appealed this decision
to the Board of Referees arguing that the section of the Act which prohibited
- the payment of such benefits violated her equality rights under the Charter.
17. Supra, note 2 at 11.
18. Supra, note 1 at 126; supra, note 2 at 11.
19. Supra, note 2 at 12.
20. For a discussion of this case in the unemployment insurance context, see UN-
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE--Caselaw Developments below.
21. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1).
Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review
The Board of Referees upheld the decision but did not make a decision on
the constitutional question. The respondent elected to challenge this decision
directly in the Federal Court of Appeal rather than appealing to an umpire.
The Court of Appeal found that the Act did violate the Charter and that the
Board of Referees had erred in not considering the constitutional arguments.
The Employment and Immigration Commission appealed the Court's
decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. The preliminary issue before the
Supreme Court was whether the Board of Referees had jurisdiction to
consider the constitutional validity of a section of the Act.
In Tetreault-Gadoury the Court for the first time was faced with deciding
whether an administrative tribunal which had not been expressly provided
with the power to consider all relevant law could apply the law. It was again
simply examining the application of section 52(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982. As section 52(1) had been held not to specifically confer jurisdiction
to make Charter findings, the Court was obliged to examine the mandate
given to the Board of Referees by the legislature in order to determine
whether they had the power to determine a legislative provision to be
unconstitutional. Mr. Justice La Forest, writing again for the majority,22 noted
that administrative tribunals are created by the state, and the state had the
ability to confer or restrict the authority of the tribunal to consider constitu-
tional matters. If the state had conferred the power, then that would be the
end of the issue. If not then the Court would be obliged to consider "other
factors" in order to make its determination.
23
The Court began its analysis by examining the Act, and La Forest J. observed
that the power to consider all relevant law, including the power to declare a
provision of the Act or Regulations ultra vires, had been expressly conferred
upon the umpire. He found it significant that the Board of Referees had not
been provided with this power and he concluded that it had not been an
oversight on the part of the legislature. While noting that the Board of
Referees was not without the practical capability to consider Charter issues,
La Forest J. held that the scheme of the Act "contemplates that the constitu-
tional question should more appropriately have been presented to the umpire,
on appeal, rather than to the Board itself".24 Therefore, applying the test
22. Lamer C.J.C., Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Stevenson and lacobucci JJ con-
curring.
23. Supra, note 3 at 10.
24. Ibid. at 11-12.
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outlined in Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks he found that while the Board
had jurisdiction over the parties, it did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter (the determination of the respondent's eligibility for benefits and the
constitutionality of the section of the Act) nor the remedy (which would have
required the Board to ignore the section of the Act which it had found
unconstitutional, a determination it had no jurisdiction to make).
25
Mr. Justice La Forest also considered some of the practical advantages which
he had canvassed in Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks. He felt that many
of these advantages were still present in the unemployment insurance context,
even though the power to make Charter findings did not rest with the tribunal
of original jurisdiction. Of particular importance to him was the ability of an
applicant to appeal to the umpire, who possessed the requisite jurisdiction.
An applicant was not required to seek redress in the regular court process; a
constitutional challenge could still be made within a relatively accessible and
inexpensive administrative proceeding. As such, the advantage of having the
constitutional issue dealt with within the administrative process was
preserved. 26
La Forest J. also believed that the unemployment insurance scheme still
allowed for the specialized expertise of the administrative tribunal to be
reflected in the consideration of Charter issues. The umpire's broad
experience with the legislation would provide valuable insight to the
determination of the Charter issue. As well, the fact that the umpire was
further up the administrative decision-making ladder (and whose func-
tions were more adjudicative in nature than the Commission's) would
render him or her in a better position to resolve difficult constitutional
questions.
2 7
While the relevance of Tetreault-Gadoury is obvious to poverty law prac-
titioners, at least in the context of Charter challenges to the unemployment
insurance scheme, there may also be important lessons to be gleaned from
the entire trilogy. Most tribunals have rendered at least partial judgments on
their jurisdiction to make Charter findings and these may need to be recon-
sidered in light of the Supreme Court's holdings.
25. Ibi4. at 12.
26. Ibid. at 12-13.
27. Ibid. at 13.
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Under section 84(1) of the Canada Pension Plan28 the Review Committee
and the Pension Appeals Board are provided with the authority to determine
any question of law or fact as to whether any benefit is payable to a person.
The Pension Appeals Board has long held that it has the jurisdiction to make
Charter determinations. In Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Kil-
patrick the Board concluded that it,
... must apply the law in its constituent statute: therein lies its mandate. It
must, therefore, determine what the law is. In the course of that process of
determination, the Board acquires the duty to decide whether that law was
validly enacted or whether it may be inoperative as offending the Charter.
29
Under the test outlined in the trilogy it would seem that the Review Commit-
tee also has the authority to consider Charter issues. Clearly the Committee
would have jurisdiction over the parties by virtue of the appeal procedures
outlined in the Plan. It would also seem the Committee would have jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter (which would be a determination of the
applicant's eligibility and the determination of whether the section impugned
violated the Charter) and the remedy (which would be to treat the section "as
of no force or effect" if found to be unconstitutional).
The Worker's Compensation Appeals Tribunal (WCAT) has also had oc-
casion to deal with the extent of its own jurisdiction to consider Charter
issues, although this was also prior to any of the decisions in the Supreme
Court of Canada's trilogy. In Decision No. 534/90130 the WCAT was con-
cerned with a bank teller who was appealing a decision of the Worker's
Compensation Board denying her benefits for an accident. The Board had found
that the teller was not employed in an industry covered by Part I of the Worker's
ConpensationAct.31 Part I only applied to industries mentioned in Schedules 1
and 2 of the Act, and banking was not mentioned in either Schedule. The teller
argued that the exclusion of bank employees violated her right to security of the
person and equality under the Charter. The preliminary issue was whether the
Tribunal had the jurisdiction to determine the constitutional question.
28. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 as amended.
29. (1989), Canadian Employment Benefits and Pension Guide Reports (C.E.B. &
P.G.R.) # 8578 at 6073. For other cases in which the Pension Appeals Board has
considered Charter issues, see the section on THE CANADA PENSION PLAN,
below.
30. (1990), 17 W.C.A.T.R. 187.
31. R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, as amended.
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Based on the weight of judicial authority and on the principles of statutory
interpretation the Tribunal concluded that it was not a 'court of competent
jurisdiction' for the purposes of section 24(1) of the Charter.32 It went on to
conclude, based on what it considered the binding authority of the Ontario
Court of Appeal's decision in Cuddy Chicks, that under the aegis of section
52(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 it could hear and determine constitutional
issues and treat any provisions of the Act which are inconsistent with the
Constitution as of no force or effect.
33
It would seem that under the test subsequently outlined in the trilogy, the
jurisdictional issue may not be so clear. Under section 86g(1) of the Act the
WCAT has the jurisdiction to determine any matter or issue expressly conferred
upon it. Pursuant to section 861(1) the WCAT may confirm, vary, reverse or
uphold any decision of the Board. Under section 75(1) of the Act the Board has
the jurisdiction to "determine all matters and questions arising under this Part".
Arguably, this power would extend to deciding whether a section of the Act is
unconstitutional. It would seem then that the Board itself would have the
jurisdiction to determine Charter issues; it would have jurisdiction over the
parties, the subject matter and the remedy.34 The Tribunal's jurisdiction would
then flow from the operation of sections 86g and 861.
Finally, the Social Assistance Review Board of Ontario (SARB) has also
considered its jurisdiction in constitutional matters. In SARB # G-12-08-2135
the Board was considering whether a section of the Regulations under the
General Welfare Assistance Act 3 6 violated the applicant's Charter rights and
first had to decide whether it had the jurisdiction to make such a determina-
32. Supra, note 29 at 217.
33. Ibid. at 217-218.
34. Interestingly, the Tribunal in Decision No. 534/901 recognized that there might be a
problem with the remedy requested in that case. The employee wanted the Tribunal
to simply treat as "of no force and effect" that section of the Act which restricted the
Act's application only to those industries mentioned in the Schedules. As the
Tribunal noted, this would produce the anomalous situation of making the worker
eligible for benefits, but would not provide a corresponding obligation on the part of
the employer to contribute to the accident fund (supra, note 29 at 202). Advocates
contemplating a Charter challenge to any poverty law scheme are well advised to ex-
amine the effect of the remedy requested upon the scheme as a whole to determine if
it is in fact a feasible solution.
35. (January 14, 1991; McCormick, Douglas, Roy).
36. R.S.O. 1980, c. 188; R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441.
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tion. The Board concluded that it was not a "court of competent jurisdiction"
under section 24(1) and went on to consider its section 52 jurisdiction.
SARB also felt bound to follow the reasoning in the Ontario Court of Appeal's
decision in Cuddy Chicks, where the majority of the Court had relied on the
provision in the Labour Relations Act that the board was to consider all
questions of law and fact. SARB recognized that it did not have the duty to
determine all questions of fact or law before it but
... the Board in carrying out its review of decisions of the Director or an Ad-
ministrator must necessarily determine all relevant questions of fact. Similar-
ly, it must determine questions of law to interpret the statute. No tribunal can
operate in a vacuum.
37
SARB concluded that it had jurisdiction under section 52 to decide whether
sections of the Act or Regulations were inconsistent with the Constitution
and were therefore of no force and effect.38 It should be noted that as at the
time of writing the Director of Income Maintenance had filed a Notice of
Judicial Review in this case, but no date had been scheduled for the applica-
tion to be heard.
Charter jurisdiction in the social assistance context may be the most difficult
to resolve in terms of the Supreme Court's trilogy. The Director or the Welfare
Administrator are not given the express power to determine questions of fact
and law, and SARB's jurisdiction is limited to affirming or rescinding the
decision, making any other decision which the Director or Welfare Ad-
ministrator could have made or referring the matter back to the decision-
maker for reconsideration in accordance with such directions as SARB
considers proper.39 It is arguable that SARB may lack jurisdiction over both
the subject matter and the remedy (similar to the conclusion reached by the
Supreme Court with respect to the Board of Referees in Tetreault-Gadoury).
It may be that advocates in this area will be required to argue that "other
factors" make it appropriate for SARB to have Charter jurisdiction. Argu-
ments on this principle would likely be framed in the context of La Forest
J.'s discussion of the practical advantages and disadvantages of having
tribunals make constitutional decisions. As has been noted these factors
include the speed and relative inexpense of an administrative proceeding, the
37. Supra, note 34 at 25.
38. Ibid. at 28.
39. Family BenefitsAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 151, s.14(6).
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calibre of the tribunal's members, their ability to compile a complete eviden-
tiary record, the relevance of their expertise in the substantive area of the law
and, perhaps most importantly, the concern for imposing unconstitutional
legislation upon applicants in the administrative process.
STANDING IN TEST CASE LITIGATION
The law of standing has come under renewed scrutiny due to the Charter.
Because of the limited resources of both clients and their advocates in poverty
law practice, issues of standing and the ability to bring test cases on behalf
of representative groups is particularly important.
Judgment was rendered May 31, 1991, in an interesting standing case in this
context. At issue in Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of B.C. v. A.G.(B.C)
4°
were provisions of the B.C. social assistance legislation 41 which vested
exclusively in the Crown the rights of an individual on assistance to claim
maintenance on his or her own behalf. One of the plaintiffs in the action
challenging these provisions was the Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of B.C.,
("FAPG") an incorporated body whose members included both low income
individuals and groups. They sought declarations that the legislation violated
ss.7 and 15 of the Charter. Parrett J. held that FAPG was not capable of
asserting claims under these sections on its own because as a corporation it
was not capable of enjoying Charter rights. He nevertheless concluded that
FAPG could bring its action as a public interest litigant, noting that:
In matters involving constitutional litigation it is necessary for the Court to
obtain a full and complete presentation of the issues before it. A declaration
by the Court with respect to this legislation has the possibility of impacting
[sic] a large class of individuals who are subject to the legislation. Further,
because of the particular concerns which FAPG has or represents, it is in an
especially advantageous and perhaps unique position to illuminate some
aspect or facet of the case which ought to be considered by the Court in
reaching its decision but which, but for the intervention by the FAPG, might
not receive any attention or prominence given the somewhat narrower inter-
est of the immediate parties to the dispute.
The Federated Anti-Poverty Groups decision is not a radical departure from
recent trends in the law of standing in Charter cases, but it is nevertheless an
interesting application of these principles to the social assistance area. The
problems of bringing and maintaining actions are particularly acute in this area
40. Vancouver Registry # A893060 (B.C.S.C.) [unreported].
41. Part 2 of the Guaranteed Income for NeedAct, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.158.
Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review
and without organized support for individual litigants the likelihood of being
able to carry major cases through to resolution often seems small indeed.
2. SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
It is appropriate to begin our review of substantive poverty law issues with
social assistance, the social welfare program of last resort and an inescapable
component of poverty law practice.
It has been an eventful year for social assistance advocacy in Ontario. The
surprise September 1990 election victory of the New Democratic Party
fuelled immediate hopes amongst advocates and other activists that improve-
ments to social assistance would become a government priority; hopes
bolstered by post-victory pledges of the new government. However, hope
turned to alarm with the deepening of the recession and the federal
government's determined efforts to slash social spending-or at least to
transfer the burden of social spending to the provinces. It is against this
background that the legal developments of the past year must be analyzed.
Any discussion of social assistance advocacy must be seen in the context of
the impact of the recession on social assistance delivery.
SOCIALASSISTANCE AND THE RECESSION
The past year saw increases in social assistance claims which staggered the
system-at the time of writing roughly one million Ontario residents are
social assistance beneficiaries. 42 The largest growth in social assistance
claims came from "unemployed employables"-people able to work but
unable to find employment. In some municipalities the general welfare
caseloads more than doubled in the space of a year.43 People whose un-
employment insurance benefits (UI) ended or who were denied UI under the
changes to the UI program44 joined those from the marginal labour force who
had never been able to find sufficient employment to qualify for UI. Under
Ontario's antiquated two-tier social assistance system, much of the burden
42. According to sttisties released by the Ministry of Community and Social Services in the
spring of 1991, the total combined number of FBA and GWA beneficiaries increased 37%
between March 1990 and March 1991. (All social assistance statistics provided hereafter
are from the Ministry of Community and Social Services unless otherwise noted.)
43. According to Ministry statistics, the caseload of "unemployed employables" rose 96%
from March 1990 to March 1991. This is a provincial average; the figures vary consider-
ably for individual municipalities depending on the local employment situation.
44. For further discussion of unemployment insurance, see Unemployment Insurance
below.
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of rising caseloads fell on local governments. 45 Although municipalities pay
only a small portion of total social assistance costs,46 these must be provided
for out of limited municipal tax bases. Thus, the most economically depressed
areas are likely to have both the highest welfare loads and the least ability to
pay.
Increased social assistance costs were also a severe additional burden to the
provincial treasury, already facing a record deficit to cover recession-fighting
spending initiatives.47 The province received a further blow from the
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Reference Re The Canada Assistance
Plan (B. C.)48.That case was a challenge brought by British Columbia to the
federal government's unilateral decision in 1990 to "cap" its previous 50-50
social assistance cost sharing arrangement under the Canada Assistance
Plan49 (CAP), an arrangement in existence since enactment of CAP in
1967.50 Although the Plan itself provided that its terms could only be altered
with provincial agreement or cancelled by prescribed notice, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that Parliament was not constrained from altering
its financial commitments and that the so-called doctrine of "legitimate
expectations" could not be invoked to give a province an effective veto over
valid federal legislation.
45. The two main pieces of social assistance legislation in Ontario are the Family
Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1980 c.151 [hereinafter FBA] and the General Welfare Assis-
tance Act, R.S.O. 1980 c.188 [hereinafter GWA]. The FBA is administered by the
Province and aimed at persons likely to require long term assistance (sole support
parents, the disabled and the aged). The GWA is administered by municipalities and
is aimed at those in temporary need (unemployed employables and people with time
limited disabilities). GWA is also in effect a transition program for those awaiting
eligibility decisions under the FBA.
46. General welfare assistance paid by municipalities is subsidized 80% by the province
(R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441, s.11(6)); the subsidy becomes 90% where the number of
persons on assistance exceeds 4% of the municipal population for four months
(R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441, s.9(6)). The Province pays 50% of welfare administration
costs as well (R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441 s.21).
47. Total expenditures on both GWA and FBA (excluding municipal expenditures) in-
creased by 39% from fiscal year 1989/90 to 1990/91 and were projected in March to
increase an additional 41% to 1991/92.
48. (15 August 1991) File# 22017 (S.C.C.) [unreported].
49. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-1.
50. GovernmentExpenditures RestraintAct, S.C. 1991, c. 9.
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The increased caseload and attendant costs has obviously had many conse-
quences-none positive-for social assistance recipients and their advo-
cates. Municipalities in particular have resorted to increasingly harsh
measures to reduce social assistance cost. For example, provision of many
essential items for recipients of assistance under both the FBA and GWA is
discretionary.51 Many municipalities have cut back or abandoned discretion-
ary spending altogether, leading to great hardship for recipients. 52
Social assistance administration has inevitably suffered as well.
Delays in processing FBA claims, which have always been unconscionable,
increased. In some places the waiting period for welfare assistance, normally
a matter of days or less, became weeks, even though the requirement for a
home visit as a precondition to granting assistance was abandoned and
additional provincial money was committed to enable new welfare intake
workers to be hired. In other municipalities the additional pressures have
merely compounded the problems of incompetent administration and abusive
treatment of applicants and recipients with which social assistance advocates
are unhappily all too familiar.
53
An ominous result of the recession and attendant costs has been the predict-
able but nevertheless disturbing backlash against social assistance recipients.
51. These include such items as rent and utility deposits, special medical costs including
special diets and pregnancy supplements, heating costs and personal needs allowan-
ces for residents of institutions (GWA s.7(2), 13; R.R.O. 1980, Reg.441 s.15). Unfor-
tunately, special assistance is cost shared at a lower rate (50%) than general
assistance (R.R.O. 1980, Reg.441 s.15(5)).
52. Even the smallest cuts can cause great hardship to the destitute. For example, one
municipality discontinued provision of bus passes to FB disability recipients, with
the result that some psychiatric patients could no longer attend day programs at out-
patient clinics.
53. As general welfare assistance is municipally delivered, delivery standards vary wide-
ly across the province. While some municipalities provide model delivery services
under difficult conditions, welfare delivery continues to be a disgrace in other areas:
eg., see SARB J-01-06-11 (May 23, 1991; Roy, Renault) [High school student ar-
bitrarily terminated by local council two months before completion of year - Appel-
lant required to appear before Council where she was reduced to tears by verbal
attacks]; SARB J-06-27-02 (January 21, 1991; Morrish, Rangan) [Assistance refused
because of moral disapproval of appellant's living in motel with her boyfriend even
though irrelevant to eligibility - Part-time welfare worker did not have time to learn
"the rules"]; SARB J-02-23-11 (March 1, 1991; Novac, Quenneville) [Welfare ad-
ministrator refused to pay eligible recipient apparently on grounds that monthly entit-
lement was too small to bother with].
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The past year saw a rise in the number of high profile media and political
attacks on social assistance, including the usual claims that welfare recipients
live "high on the hog" at the expense of "ordinary" working people, that abuse
of the system was rampant and that social assistance undermined the com-
petitiveness of the economy and threatened economic recovery.
54
At the time of writing an end to the recession is still not clearly in sight, nor
have we seen all the consequences of the current "restructuring" of the
Ontario economy. Even if the economy does start an upturn in the fall of 1991,
this will not mean an immediate drop in social assistance caseloads and in
fact caseloads will almost certainly continue to rise for some time - the best
that can be hoped for in the short run is a decline in the rate of growth. Social
assistance will continue to be a crucial component of poverty law practice in
Ontario.
THE LAW REFORM PROCESS
A major focal point for social assistance advocacy in the past year was the
law reform process. By the time of the New Democratic Party's election
victory, many social assistance activists thought the law reform process
envisaged in Transitions, the 1988 report of the Social Assistance Review
Committee, to be moribund. However, the new government made several
public statements of its commitment to social assistance reform. The year
began with revitalized hopes for meaningful changes in social assistance
administration.
The new government's initial actions regarding social assistance reform were
encouraging. Steps had already been taken by the predecessor Liberal ad-
ministration to establish a legislative review process including consultation
with stakeholders outside the government. A Minister's Advisory Group on
New Social Assistance had already been struck and several "project teams"
instituted to consider different areas of law reform. The project teams
included social assistance activists, advocates from community legal clinics
and consumers. The government announced that the legislative review
process would be "fast tracked" and expanded its commitment to community
54. The highest profile examples were a series of inflammatory articles published by
columnist Diane Francis in the Toronto Sun and Financial Post. However, many
more examples could be drawn from local and regional media around the province.
Although some efforts were made by the Ministry of Community and Social Services
to correct the serious factual inaccuracies of the Francis articles and there was some
sympathetic press coverage in response, the damage done by such media activities
which reinforce popular welfare mythology can probably never be undone.
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consultation, including consultation with social assistance recipients
throughout the province.
The first public results of the law reform process came in March 1991 with the
release of Back On Track, the interim report of the Minister's Advisory Group.
The Report-its title deliberately chosen to imply a return to the impetus for
reform which began with Transitions-made some 88 recommendations for
immediate change. The government responded to Back On Track in May 1991.
Although the government declined to commit itself to the whole package, it did
accept a significant number of the recommendations and two sets of changes
were announced, with timetables of August 1, 1991 and October 1, 1991
respectively. While the reform package contained too many elements to be
discussed in detail here, it is particularly interesting to note that the government
specifically committed itself to establishing a "Council of Consumers" made up
of social assistance recipients to monitor the system and provide advice to the
government.55 The government remains publicly committed to a complete
overhaul of Ontario social assistance legislation, with the final report of the
Advisory Group expected in early 1992.
Despite the apparently sincere commitment of the government to social
assistance reform, the future of the reform process is still in question. Initially,
the main concern of some of the non-governmental participants in the process
was resistance from the social assistance bureaucracy-a group with no
particular demonstrated commitment to fundamental change of the system-
but the focus of concern has now shifted to the effects of the recession and
the "cap on CAP". Major new spending initiatives are clearly out of the
question in the near future, as further expansion of the provincial deficit
seems politically impossible. Severe as the recession has been, however, the
"cap on CAP" may ultimately have even more far-reaching consequences for
social assistance in Ontario-indeed, rumours have circulated that Bill C-69
was in part a response by the federal government to Ontario's proposed
expansion of social assistance spending. Since 1967, provincial social assis-
tance planning has proceeded on the assumption that provincial expenditures
would be cost-shared dollar for dollar by federal funds. This change in the
rules of the game is likely to have some chilling effect on long term planning.
It is too soon to predict what this will all mean for the law reform process in the
long run. New legislation is still at least a couple of years in the future, at which
55. Statement to the Ontario Legislature of Hon. Zanana Akande, Minister of Com-
munity and Social Services, May 21, 1991.
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time both the Ontario economy and the federal political scene may look very
different. We may close this section by noting that even if the federal attacks on
social spending continue to affect the province's capacity to commit to major
new social assistance expenditures, there is still much room for improvement to
make the social assistance system operate more efficiently, humanely and fairly,
and to show greater respect to those who must rely on it.
THE SOCIALASSISTANCE REVIEW BOARD
It has been a challenging year for the Social Assistance Review Board
(SARB) and social assistance advocacy. The quality of the Board in all
respects has improved dramatically over the past four years. However, the
Board has been under considerable pressure recently. The combination of
increased social assistance caseloads and better information to clients about
appeal rights meant a substantial increase in appeals. The Board's capacity
to deal with these pressures was affected by the fact that it was short-staffed
for much of the year due to illnesses and resignations. Particularly important
was the resignation in the fall of 1990 of the Chair, Joanne Campbell, who
since her appointment in 1987 had presided over the dramatic changes at the
Board. Apart from losing an experienced administrator, Ms. Campbell's
departure meant that the hiring of new Board members could not be com-
pleted until a new Chair was appointed.
The most notable effect of the increased pressures on the Board has been
increased delays in dealing with appeals. SARB has been plagued for some time
with chronic backlogs and delays at almost all stages of the appeals process.
Improvements were being made in these areas prior to this year but progress
seems to have been halted and even reversed. Advocates have encountered
ever-increasing delays at most stages of the process, including scheduling of
hearings, release, of decisions and-perhaps most troubling-in processing
requests for interim assistance pending hearings. It hardly need be said that delay
is perhaps the single greatest concern in the social benefit program of last resort.
Another disappointment specifically for advocates is that-despite repeated
statements that publication of decisions and the hiring of a full time publications
editor are imminent-SARB's decisions are still not publicly available. Without
access to the Board's decisions, full analysis of SARB's jurisprudence and the
trends of social assistance adjudication is still impossible.
56
56. The Clinic Resource Office has begun collecting and indexing SARB decisions to
make them available to clinic practitioners (the largest group of social assistance ad-
vocates before the Board). Reference to SARB decisions in this article are from the
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Hopefully the Board will soon be able to start making inroads on its problems.
A new Chair has been appointed and took up her duties in July 1991. New
board members have been appointed and will, when their training is complete
(sometime in the fall of 1991) bring the Board back up to full strength. While
the number of appeals obviously will not drop in the immediate future, this
should leave the Board better equipped to handle its caseload. In the longer
run it seems that the future directions of the Board will be closely tied to
developments in the law reform process. It seems probable at this stage that
SARB's jurisdiction will be significantly expanded under any new social
assistance legislation, which will in turn inevitably have implications for the
role of the Board in social assistance adminisration
PARTICULAR ISSUES
The rest of this review of social assistance will consider some issues in social
assistance advocacy in Ontario and their developments over the past year,
with a particular focus on the results of litigation activities or likely areas for
future litigation.
SocialAssistance and the Charter
Social assistance programs in Canada have for the most part still not been
subject to serious Charter scrutiny. Despite speculation from the time of the
Charter's enactment, there has still not been a judicial decision on the
fundamental issue of whether the right to life, liberty and security of the
person, protected by s.7 of the Charter, includes some degree of protection
of the right to receive subsistence level benefits. 57 Furthermore, surprisingly
few equality arguments have been made to date in this context. There have
been no judicial decisions in Ontario at all dealing with s.15 of the Charter.
58
CRO collection. However, there are many decisions to which the CRO does not have
access because the appellant was not represented by a clinic practitioner.
57. Although s.7 arguments have been raised in a number of social assistance cases of
which we are aware, the cases have all been disposed of without decision on the
point or are still pending. The situation with respect to s.7 has not changed sig-
nificantly from that discussed in Morrison, "Poverty Law and The Charter: The Year
In Review" (1990), 6 J.L. & Social Pol'y 1.
58. There have been no significant Charter decisions from SARB dealing with Ontario
social assistance legislation, at least none that have become public knowledge, al-
though the Board has given superficial consideration to Charter issues in a few
cases. It is interesting to note, though, that the Board did in one decision use the
Charter to overrule a Ministry policy. The Board held that in the peculiar cir-
cumstances of the case strict application of the policy would violate s.15: SARB H-
12-30-14 (December 24, 1990; Draper, Quenneville).
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Indeed, the only Charter decision of any significance this year dealing with
social assistance would appear to be the decision in the Federated Anti-
Poverty Groups of B.C. case.59 Although a final decision has not yet been
rendered in the case, in the course of denying a motion to strike out the
statement of claim as disclosing no significant cause of action, Parrett J. made
the following comments about the plaintiffs' equality argument:
Applying the test under s.15 of the Charter, it is clear that persons receiving
income assistance constitute a discrete and insular minority within the mean-
ing of s.15. It may be reasonably inferred that because recipients of public
assistance generally lack substantial political influence, they comprise "those
groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no ap-
parent interest in attending". 60
The decision in the FAPG case is likely to spur more litigation activity around
equality issues in social assistance. All social assistance schemes in Canada
are built around distinctions based on age, sex, disability and a host of other
grounds (such as marital and family status) which are arguably prohibited
grounds of discrimination under s.15 of the Charter. In.addition, the ad-
ministration of almost all social assistance schemes results in adverse impact
along lines of sex, disability and family status even where there is no express
legislative distinction. Despite the many barriers to Charter litigation in the
poverty law arena, it is unlikely that this state of affairs will continue
unchallenged indefinitely.
Single Mothers and the Obligation to Pursue Support
Sole support parents, who are almost all women, make up the largest-and, due
to women's particularly disadvantaged position in the economic order6 1-fastest
growing category of FBA recipients.62 The rules governing assistance to sole
59. Supra, note 39.
60. Ibid. at 29-30 of the unreported judgment.
61. About 85% of all single parent families are headed by women. Nationally, some 75%
of never-married single mothers live in poverty; while 52% of all other single
mothers live in poverty. On average, single mothers live at 61% of the Statistics
Canada poverty line. Source: National Council on Welfare, Women and Poverty
Revisited (1990: Supply and Services Canada).
62. According to Ministry statistics, the number of sole support Parents receiving FB as-
sistance increased by 25.7% from March 1990 to March 1991, jumping ahead of dis-
abled and permanently unemployable recipients, previously the largest recipient
group. These figures count only recipients; the number of beneficiaries of sole sup-
port parent allowances (i.e., children) is much larger.
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support parents have always been of concern to recipients and their advocates
and have given rise to some of the most difficult legal problems in this area.
One such problem area is the notorious "man in the house" rule. Eligibility
for sole support parent benefits requires that the recipient not live with a
"spouse". This was one of the most litigated issues under the FBA until the
definition of spouse was amended in 1987 to exclude persons with no support
obligation towards the applicant or her children. While the amendments have
improved the situation somewhat, they have by no means eliminated all the
problems in this area. Applicants have been disqualified because they con-
tinued to share a residence with a person deemed to be their spouse under the
legislation, even though they lived separate and apart in the same premises
and were unable to separate for economic reasons. More disturbingly, ap-
plicants have been disqualified because they were unable to rid themselves
of an abusive spouse.63 More problems are likely to arise now that an
effective three-year moratorium on pursuit of "common law" relationships
has ended. 64 It seems likely that various aspects of these rules will at some
point be subject to challenge under the Charter of Rights.
Another problem area is the obligation imposed on sole support mothers to
seek spousal and/or child support from the fathers of their children. Ontario's
FBA regulations require an applicant or recipient for assistance to make
"reasonable efforts" to realize any financial resources to which she or her
dependants might be entitled. 65 If she fails to do so, benefits may be refused
altogether or her allowance may be reduced by the amount of income deemed
to be available,66 even though neither the mother nor her children receive any
benefit from any such support actually obtained. 67
1
63. SARB J-06-06-03 (Nov. 29, 1990; Draper, Heath).
64. The social assistance definition of "spouse" excludes persons who cohabit in a con-
jugal relationship where there is no other support obligation for a period of three
years: R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 318 s.1(1)(d)(iv), 1(lb). As a practical matter this rule,
which came into effect November 1, 1987, meant that such relationships were
granted a three year moratorium.
65. The same obligation exists for GWA recipients (R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441 s.3(3)) but
primarily affects FB recipients. The discussion here applies to both Acts.
66. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 318 (FBA) s.8; R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441 (GWA) s.3(3) imposes the
same duty on welfare applicants and recipients.
67. Support payments are deducted dollar for dollar from any social assistance entitle-
ment: R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 318 (FBA) s.13(2).
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Women often have good reasons for not wanting to pursue support. In many
cases they or their children have suffered physical, emotional or sexual abuse
from the father. In some cases he may threaten to seek custody in response
to a support application. In other cases the parties may have reached an
agreement acceptable to themselves which the father threatens to repudiate
if the woman reopens the support issue-some men have quit jobs rather than
pay increased support. In yet other cases the circumstances of conception are
such that it would be intensely embarrassing or traumatic for the woman to
pursue support. Although the FBA administration has developed policies
setting out when the obligation to seek support may be waived,68 it is clear
that the spirit of the policy is often not followed.69 One study has suggested
that racial bias has been a factor in the application of the policy.
70
It is also interesting to note that the FB Policy does not require applicants or
recipients to pursue other forms of support to which they may be entitled
under the Family Law Act. Furthermore, the policy does not contemplate
exceptions in some of the fact situations described above.
SARB has generally been sensitive in recent years to these issues (at least to
the extent the legislative framework allows) but the judicial response has
been disappointing. In Campbell v. Director of Income Maintenance71 , the
first Ontario appellate decision to directly consider the application of s.8, the
Divisional Court summarily dismissed an appeal without any real analysis of
the obligation imposed by the section or the issues raised by its application.
Campbell is, unfortunately, typical of judicial insensitivity to the complexity
and sensitivity of the issues involved in the obligation to seek support.72
68. It is significant that the policy guidelines dealing with support issues is one of the
longest sections of the FB Policy Manual.
69. For example, in one case a woman who left a relationship in which she had suffered
verbal and physical abuse from a man who had also had serious outbursts of
dangerous violence against other people, was told by a Family Benefits worker that
the obligation to seek support would not be waived because her relationship did not
exceed the "normal average level of abuse": SARB G-10-20-09 (May 1, 1989).
70. Kathleen Lawrence, "Systemic Discrimination: Regulation 8-Family Benefits Act:
Policy of Reasonable Efforts To Obtain Financial Resources" (1990), 6 Journal of
Law and Social Pol'y 57.
71. (1990), 71 D.L.R.(4th) 765 (Ont.Div.Ct.).
72. See also S.v.K; The Queen In Right of Ontario, Intervenant (1986), 55 O.R.(2d) 111
(Dist.Ct.); Re Clifton and Director of Income Maintenance (1985), 53 O.R.(2d) 33
(Div.Ct.).
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Ontario courts may be forced to pay closer attention to these issues in the
future. In the Federated Anti-Poverty Groups case,73 the British Columbia
Supreme Court dismissed an application to strike out the statement of claim
in a case challenging the constitutionality of that province's support obliga-
tion rules Charter. The plaintiffs are arguing in part that the support obliga-
tion rules discriminate against poor women, in violation of s.15 of the
Charter, and that compelling pursuit of support in some cases deprives
women of liberty and security of the person in contravention of s.7 of the
Charter. While the specific legislative provisions under consideration in that
action are different from s.8, success in that case would nevertheless be very
important for the status of the obligation to seek support in Ontario law.
Disability Benefits and the FBA
The other main group of FBA recipients are people eligible as either "dis-
abled" or "permanently unemployable" persons. Eligibility appeals on these
issues make up more than half the FBA appeals to SARB. One reason for the
high volume of appeals has been what is in effect a stand-off between SARB
and the Ministry. SARB has ruled in many cases that the test for "permanently
unemployable" status is not a purely medical test but involves a consideration
of sociological factors as well; that is, the Board will not only consider the
nature of the disability but its effect on employability in light of such factors
as the applicant's age, education and work history.
74
Although the success rate of appeals from negative decisions has clearly
indicated that the Ministry does not apply the same test, it was not until this
year that the Ministry decided to challenge the Board in court. However
(apparently in response to another Back on Track recommendation), the
Ministry withdrew its appeal before hearing and announced that new
eligibility guidelines would be formulated in this area. This development will
potentially affect many people in Ontario-most social assistance advocates
are aware of people who are effectively unemployable for all practical
purposes but who have had to subsist for years on the lower general welfare
rates because they were not accepted by the Ministry as eligible for FBA.
Trust Funds and SocialAssistance Entitlement
After several years of litigation both at SARB and the Divisional Court, the
Ministry appears finally to have accepted that a trust fund cannot be treated
73. Supra, note 39.
74. SARB G-02-12-06R (July 30, 1990; Draper, Nikias, Ching).
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as a liquid asset in the hands of the recipient where payment out of the fund
is wholly discretionary in the hands of the trustee. While this proposition was
clearly judicially established in 1987, 75 the Ministry persisted in appealing
matters involving discretionary trusts. However, the Ministry was defeated
in a series of SARB and Divisional Court appeals this year and the law would
appear to be settled.
76
Although this rule applies to both FBA and GWA recipients, it has a particular
impact on those, especially disabled people, who will be on social assistance
for lengthy periods. The families of such persons can now make at least some
provision for special health, social and educational needs of such recipients
without running the risk that the recipient will be disqualified from benefits
or required to exhaust all the funds on day-to-day living expenses. At present,
however, they can only do so by creating a wholly discretionary trust such
that the recipient has no control over the decision to make payments out. It
is interesting to note that Back on Track recommended that regulations be
changed to allow disabled recipients to receive small or moderate estates
without losing their allowances. The Ministry has announced that this recom-
mendation will be implemented as of October 1, 1991.
Eligibility of Unemployed Employables
The largest category of general welfare recipients are the so-called "un-
employed employables". There were some interesting developments with
respect to this class in the past year.
The first development is with respect to the grounds for eligibility. The
definition of "person in need" for the purposes of the GWA refers to a person
whose need arises from an "inability to obtain regular employment". 77 Many
municipalities have interpreted this to mean that a person who is self-
employed or who is employed full time is categorically ineligible for welfare
regardless of the level of their earnings. One consequence of this interpretation
was that in about half the municipalities in Ontario, the so-called "working
poor" have not been considered eligible for income supplementation from
75. Re Director of Income Maintenance Branch and Henson (1987), 26 O.A.C. 332
(Div.Ct.), aff'd by C.A. Sept. 22, 1989 without reasons.
76. See Re Director of Income Maintenance Branch and Homan (November 9, 1990)
File # 959/88 (Ont.Div.Ct.) [unreported endorsement]; Re Walker and Director ofIn-
come Maintenance Branch (May 6, 1991) File # 116/89 (Ont.Div.Ct.) [unreported
endorsement].
77. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441 s.l(2)(a).
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general welfare, even though the regulatory scheme clearly contemplates
this.78 However, SARB ruled this year, in a case involving a self-employed
commission salesperson, that the term "regular employment" in this context
had to be interpreted consistently with the purpose of the Act, and meant that
the employment must pay more than the basic welfare entitlement.79 The
Ministry has announced, again in response to a Back On Track recommenda-
tion, that GWA regulations will be amended October 1, 1991, to clarify that
the working poor are eligible for income supplementation.
A second interesting development was with respect to the rule pursuant to
which an employable applicant for general welfare may be disqualified if he
or she has "any history of unemployment" for reasons within his or her
control.80 This rule received judicial attention this year in Mario Laviolette
v. United Counties of Prescott and Russell.81 The appellant had been working
in Quebec in a location about 200 km. from his home town but left his job to
return to his home town when his girlfriend became pregnant. He had been
promised a job upon his return but the job was not available on the date
promised and the appellant was forced to apply for welfare. He was refused
on the grounds that his unemployment was within his control. Southey J., for
the majority of the Court, held that "the mere fact that the applicant left his
last job voluntarily is not in itself a sufficient basis for finding him to be
ineligible for assistance". He held in effect that where an applicant's decision
to quit a job was reasonable under all the circumstances and was not for the
purpose of obtaining welfare, the disqualification should not apply.
The Ministry has announced, as part of the Back On Track implementation,
that the regulation relating to job search requirements and history of un-
employment will be repealed and replaced soon. Whether Laviolette will
have any ongoing impact will depend on whether these changes are in fact
made and the precise wording of any new provisions.
Welfare and Students
As noted above, a consequence of the recession has been increasing pressure
on discretionary programs administered by municipalities under the General
Welfare Assistance Act. One major area of discretion is the provision of
78. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441 s.13(2)1.
79. SARBJ.05-03.08 (Jan. 14, 1991; Rangan, Rotter).
80. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 441 s.3(1)(b)(iii).
81. (1991), 44 O.A.C. 255 (Div.Ct.).
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welfare to students who, if employable, require the permission of the welfare
administrator to attend school full time.
The issue in Shelley Kerr v. Metropolitan Toronto,82 as posed by Archie
Campbell J. writing for the unanimous Court, was: "Do Ontario's welfare
regulations prevent a twenty year old woman, who went back to school to
finish grade 12, from getting welfare because she worked for a few months
as a clerk?" In its decision in the case, SARB had taken a position put forward
by neither of the parties and held that a person who was in fact able to find
ajob was not a "person in need" as defined in the legislation and was therefore
categorically ineligible for consideration as a student. The Court reversed the
Board's decision, finding that an applicant for student welfare needed only
to be financially eligible for assistance and not necessarily unable to find any
kind of employment.
Campbell J. began his reasons observing that the Social Assistance Review
Board "was faced with the difficult task of interpreting a complex and
confusing regulatory scheme" and concluded by expressing "the greatest
sympathy for the Board in its attempt to interpret a Kafkaesque regulation so
complex and ambiguous that it becomes a lawyer's nightmare". He noted in
passing that the word "eligible"-interpretation of which was central to the
case-was used in the regulation "in a circular, undefined, random, tautologi-
cal and inconsistent sense".
The decision in Kerr-if it stands83-is significant beyond the particular
issue at stake. After stating that "The first principle of interpretation is that
the social welfare regime established by the Act and regulations should be
interpreted largely and liberally", Campbell J. went on to discuss the "social,
economic and administrative context of the regulations", relying heavily on
the description of the workings of the social assistance system in Transitions.
He held that it made good economic sense to spend money now to reduce the
likelihood of future long term welfare dependency, and held that the student
welfare rules should be interpreted with this principle in mind.
82. (1991) 4 O.R. (3d) 430 (Div.Ct.). The Appellant was represented by Scarborough
Community Legal Services, Toronto.
83. As of the date of writing an application for leave to appeal to the Ontario Court of
Appeal has been made. However, the municipality has not yet made a final decision
whether to pursue or drop the application for leave.
Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review
Kerr is one of the most important judicial attempts to analyze the nature and
purpose of the GWA. As such, it is certain to be relied on heavily by advocates
for its interpretive guidance. However, with respect to student welfare
specifically, a much greater area of potential conflict is left untouched by the
decision. Kerr says only that the welfare administrator may grant benefits to
a would-be student, not that he must do so. There is a double discretion
involved in deciding whether a student shall be granted welfare. The welfare
administrator must approve both the course the student wishes to attend and
the individual applicant's attendance at it. SARB may legally substitute its
own opinion for that of the welfare administrator with respect to both aspects
of this discretion.
84
SARB's power to overrule an administrator's discretion is relatively un-
problematical with respect to a decision whether a given individual should
be allowed to attend an approved course. However, it is a much more difficult
question whether it is appropriate for a Board of this nature, which hears cases
de novo and not as a review tribunal, to decide what courses should be
authorized by a municipality when-for better or worse-the legislature has
made this a matter of local judgment.85 This goes to the fundamental issue,
almost entirely avoided to date, of the Board's role in supervising the
administration of social assistance in a two-tiered delivery system. This is
just one of the many issues that will have to be addressed in planning. the role
of SARB under new social assistance legislation.
Fighting the Backlash
The final litigation issue to be considered here is also one of the most
disturbing. As noted above, one development of the recession has been a
political backlash against welfare recipients. This backlash has been trans-
lated into direct action in one municipality. On September 5, 1990; the
Hastings County Council passed a resolution-accompanied by reiteration
of all the usual tired myths of rampant welfare abuse and fraud86 -requiring
their welfare administrator to provide the Council with the names of all
welfare recipients in the municipality.
84. FBA s.14(6)(b); incorporated by reference to GW appeals, GWA s.11.
85. The Board itself has been inconsistent on this issue to date.
86. J. Evans, "Reeve complains about welfare system" [Bancrof] Intelligencer (9 June
1990); J. Evans, "County Councillors can get list of welfare recipients", ibid. (6 Sept.
1990); J. Rafter, "Councillors to personally check welfare roles" The [Kingston]
Whig-Standard (17 Sept. 1990).
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Before the list could be released to the Council an application was brought
by a welfare recipient, to prevent the resolution being given effect.87 It was
argued in part that release of the names, in view of the proposed use of the
list, would violate the Charter rights of all welfare recipients in the area. An
interim injunction was granted to the applicant on November 21, 1990,
prohibiting release of the names and the matter was adjourned sine die, the
judge apparently believing that the issue would become moot upon the
coming into force of the Municipal Freedom of Information Act88 on January
1, 1991. This belief unfortunately proved wrong. On August 1, 1991, the
Information and Privacy Commission gave its opinion that the Council was
entitled to see the list.89 The opinion relied on provisions of the legislation
which provide that information may be disclosed within an institution to
persons who needed the information to carry out their duties.90 Disappoint-
ingly, in light of the comments attending the passing of the Council resolu-
tion, the Commission did not challenge or even question the Council's
assertion that it did in fact have a "need to know" in respect of the information.
At the time of writing the Municipality has indicated its intention of carrying
out the resolution and the judicial proceedings have been reinstituted. This
appears to be the first time in Ontario that the protection of the judicial system
has been sought against this kind of attack on social assistance recipients and
there is much at stake in the proceedings. Although the Ministry of Com-
munity and Social Services has expressed its unhappiness with the Council's
decision, it has as yet made no attempt to impose a legislative solution. A
number of groups have indicated their intention to seek intervenor status
when the case next returns to court, including the National Anti-Poverty
Organization, the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty and the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association. If their challenge fails, it seems likely that other
municipalities will quickly follow suit on what would clearly be a popular
political measure in some parts of the province.
87. The applicant is represented by Hastings and Prince Edward Legal Services, Bel-
leville.
88. S.O. 1989, c.63.
89. Information and Privacy Commission Investigation Report; Investigation Number
191-09M.
90. Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1989, s.32(d);
O.Reg. 517/90, s.3(2).
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3. WORKER'S COMPENSATION
Workers' compensation is consistently one of the largest areas of poverty law
practice in Ontario and, in some ways, has been the most contentious. Most
recently, the amendments to the Worker's Compensation Act (which became
effective on January 1, 1990) have given rise to whole new areas of concern
to advocates in this field. These amendments, and the policy development
process and litigation which they have engendered, have been played out
against the backdrop of an injured worker community and its advocates who
have felt little but distrust for a Board which they feel rarely, if ever, is
representative of their interests.
NEW APPOINTMENTS
There have been a few administrative changes at the Worker's Compensation
Board which, it is hoped, will augur well for the future. Odoardo Di Santo
(formerly Director of the Office of the Worker Advisor) was appointed the
new Chairperson, replacing Dr. Robert Elgie. Brian King (past Chairman of
the Saskatchewan WCB and Chairperson of the Manitoba WCB) was ap-
pointed Vice-Chairperson and Director of Administration, replacing Mr. Alan
Wolfson. It is hoped that these appointments will lead to some important
changes in the administration at the Board and will provide some opportunities
for injured worker's advocates to have input into its policies and direction.
Two new vice-chairs have been created on the corporate Board, one repre-
senting employers and the other representing the labour side. The two new
vice-chairs will sit on Board and staff committees and it is hoped they will
play an influential role in the External Consultation process. It is anticipated
that this will allow for greater participation by these two constituencies in
policy decision-making and application and in the administration of the Act.
Perhaps most importantly, both from a symbolic and practical point of view,
Steve Mantis has been appointed as a member of the Board of Directors. Mr.
Mantis has been active in the Thunder Bay and District Injured Worker's
Group and the March of Dimes and is the first injured worker to sit on the
Board of Directors.
POLICY PROPOSALS
Two policy proposals which are of interest to the injured worker community
and its advocates will be going through the public hearings process, begin-
ning in the late fall of 1991.
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Entitlement in the Ontario Worker's Compensation System
9 1
This Proposal followed a somewhat tortuous route to its present stage,
beginning with the Board's release of a discussion paper on "work-related-
ness" in May of 1990. Subsequently, due to a number of different factors, the
Board embarked on a full policy review of the entitlement issue. The Policy
Proposal reviews each element of the entitlement issue and proposes a
general approach to determining when a worker has suffered a work-related
injury by accident for which he or she should be compensated under the
Worker's Compensation Act. Section 3(1) of the Act provides:
3(1) Where in any employment, to which this Part applies, personal injury
by accident arising out of and in the course of employment is caused to a
worker, the worker and the worker's dependants are entitled to benefits in
the manner and to the extent provided under this Act.
The Proposal addresses each of the following subjects fairly thoroughly
(though not always satisfactorily):
- the definition of "injury by accident";
- the operation of the presumption clause;
- the "in the course of employment" requirement;
- the "arising out of employment" requirement; and
- "serious and wilful misconduct" under the Act.
The Proposal does present some positive changes. It is recommended that the
definition of "accident" in section 1(1)(a) of the Act should not be construed
as an exhaustive definition, and that the general concept of accident should
be conveyed by the term "accident" itself, with the enumerated types of
accidents in the section to be considered special situations which would not
otherwise fall within that meaning. 92 This approach would include the
'unanticipated results of normal occurrences' within the general category of
accidents, and would make the presumption clause applicable in such cases.
91. Ontario Worker's Compensation Board, Entitlement in the Ontario Worker's Com-
pensation System, (Policy Proposal), May 8, 1991.
92. Supra, note 90 at 6. Section 1(1)(a) of the Act provides that the term "accident" in-
cludes (i) a wilful and intentional act, not being the act of the worker, (ii) a chance
event occasioned by a physical or natural cause, and (iii) disablement arising out of
and in the course of employment.
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The Proposal also recommends some specific rules for dealing with some of
the most difficult (though recurring) fact situations in the determination of
whether an accident arose "in the course of employment". Many of these rules
involve a search for a 'strong employment connection' between the activity
and the employment before a positive conclusion can be reached. 9
3
Some of the recommendations in the Proposal clearly have negative implica-
tions, and if adopted, could result in more litigation around these issues. One
such recommendation concerns the use of "serious and wilful misconduct"
on the part of the worker as a bar to the receipt of benefits under the Act,
unless the injury results in death or serious impairment.94 Presently the Board
interprets 'serious impairment' as resulting in six weeks or more of temporary
total disability or permanent disability. The recommendation suggests that
'serious impairment' (juxtaposed as it is with the term 'death') should
"connote a physical or functional loss or abnormality that is very grave". 95
Another point of concern in the Policy Proposal is the test recommended for
determining the "arising out of the course of employment" requirement. The
test requires the employment to be a 'significant contributing factor', which
the Proposal suggests necessitates "both an employment connection and a
medical connection between the injury and the employment". 96 The employ-
ment connection would be established 'if there was something about the work
which contributed to the injury by accident'. 97 The medical connection will
be established by first determining whether the injury sustained is
'compatible' with the employment contribution and, if so, 'whether the
evidence indicates that it is more likely than not that the injury would have
developed or occurred in any event in more or less the same timeframe
without the employment contribution'. 98 Even with 'helpful' Board
guidelines, it is not hard to imagine that Board decision-makers will have a
difficult time applying this test accurately or consistently, which will, of
course be to the detriment of injured workers.
93. Ibid. note 90 at Appendix D.
94. Supra, note 30, s. 3(7).
95. Supra, note 90, Appendix G at 3.
96. Supra, note 90 at 9.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
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Compensation for Disablements Arising from Workplace Stressors
99
This Policy Proposal also followed an overland route before arriving at the
public hearings stage. Policy development commenced in January of 1989
when the Board issued a discussion paper on the issue. An options paper was
issued in July, 1989, a modified policy proposal followed in April, 1990 and
finally this Policy Proposal in May of 1991.
Workplace stressors are generally viewed as employment conditions which
span a period of time, and claims for compensation on this basis are adjudi-
cated under the 'disablement' section of the definition of accident. In these
cases it is necessary to determine whether the worker has a 'diagnosed
psychological disorder' and whether that disorder arose out of and in the
course of employment.
As evidence of this first point the Board recommends that the diagnosis be
in terms similar to those used in the DSM-III-R.100 However, in recognition
of the worker community's view that a psychiatrist is not the only medical
practitioner capable of making such a diagnosis, the Board accepted that "the
actual process of diagnosis may be made by any qualified medical prac-
titioner". However, in the Policy Proposal the "actual process of diagnosis"
is not outlined. 101
The Board also recommends that the test for causation be the same as the one
proposed in the Proposal on Entitlement; that is, whether the employment
was a 'significant contributing factor' to the development of the psychologi-
cal disorder. Many of the concerns discussed above are therefore relevant to
a discussion of this Proposal.
One further point for concern with this Proposal is the section dealing with
"Non-work-related stressors". It is argued that evidence concerning non-
work-related stressors may be relevant to establishing the medical connection
between the disorder and the employment. Leaving aside the possible in-
vasiveness of such an inquiry,102 there is no discussion as to how the evidence
99. Ontario Worker's Compensation Board, Compensation for Disablements Arising
from Workplace Stressors, (Policy Proposal), May 8, 1991.
100. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (3rd ed.), Washington D.C., 1987.
101. Supra, note 98 at 7.
102. The Board intends to "restrict its investigation to essential information and balance the
worker's right to privacy with the necessities of adjudication". Supra, note 98 at 9.
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of such non-work-related stressors is to be balanced. As one commentator
has noted on this issue:
If the claim would have been allowed in the absence of personal stressors,
because there were sufficient workplace stressors to cause the disability, why
should it be denied just because there are additional personal stressors in a
worker's life?
103
WORKER'S COMPENSATION APPEALS TRIBUNAL DECISIONS
Stress Claims
While the Board was engaged in its policy process with respect to stress
claims, the Tribunal was involved in mapping out its own approach. In
Decision 684/89104 the Tribunal provided some indication of its thinking on
some of the complex issues involved in stress claims. On the issue of the
evidence necessary to establish a psychiatric disorder, it concluded that while
a psychiatrist's report may be the most desirable, it was not a necessary
prerequisite. Evidence was to be assessed on its reliability, content and
analysis, and not on the arbitrary standard of who produced it.105 The
Tribunal however, did conclude that it was necessary to consider non-work-
related stressors in order to determine entitlement, rejecting arguments that
such an inquiry was an invasion of the worker's privacy.10 6 Finally, the
Tribunal recognized (but did not decide between) the two standards of proof
which other panels had been applying in determining stress claims; whether
the workplace stressor must be the 'predominant factor' in the development
of the disability, or whether it need only be a 'significant contributing
factor'.1
0 7
103. D. Craig, "'Compensating For Disablements Arising From Workplace Stressors' - A
Review of the Policy Proposal of the Worker's Compensation Board", (December,
1990) TheLA.V.G.O. Reporting Service, Vol. 5, No. 1, 25 at 32.
104. (1990), 16 W.C.A.T.R. 132. This was the second successful stress claim at the
WCAT. The first was Decision No. 145189 (1990), 14 W.C.A.T.R. 74.
105. Supra, note 103 at 148.
106. Ibid. at 148-149. In this regard the Tribunal considered the worker's financial status,
the fact that she was entering menopause and the commencement of her new roman-
tic relationship.
107. Ibid. at 149. The panel reasoned that as there were no significant non-work stressors
in the worker's life, it was not necessary to decide what standard of proof to apply.
This of course raises the issue as to what is a 'significant' non-work stressor.
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The Tribunal allowed its third stress claim in Decision No. 952/89.108 What
is significant about this decision is that for the first time the Tribunal was
considering an acute onset of disability rather than a gradual onset which had
been at issue in other cases.
The worker had become extremely agitated and immediately left his place of
employment after being confronted by his foreman about his work habits and
his personal hygiene. He subsequently missed six weeks of work due to
alleged acute depression for which he had sought medical attention. The
panel noted that while the worker had a predisposition to being depressed he
had overcome such episodes on his own without medical attention, and this
non-work related factor should not be a bar to his entitlement. On the basis
of the evidence provided only by the family doctor, a community health nurse
and the worker the Tribunal concluded that the worker was disabled by a
stress related condition which was related to his employment. 109
Precedent in Tribunal Proceedings
Of interest to all advocates appearing before the Tribunal is Decision No.
1004/89.110 In that case the panel had to consider the weight which should
be attached to previous decisions on the same issue made by other panels of
the Tribunal. The Tribunal concluded that the answer was largely dependent
upon the facts and issues in the case at hand. Each panel had an obligation to
consider every argument presented, but also to be advised of prior decisions
of the Tribunal on the same or similar issues. In the context of jurisdictional
issues, the Tribunal concluded that it was required to get the answer right so
as to avoid deciding upon issues over which it had no jurisdiction. On issues
concerning interpretation of the Act, it found that there was merit in following
precedent so as to insure consistency in decision-making and predictability
for the parties. Finally, the Tribunal added:
... whenever a subsequent panel substantially departs from the reasoning of
a previous decision, there is an obligation to address and explain the reasons
for such a departure.
111
108. (January 23, 1991; Bigras, Ronson, Cook).
109. Ibid. at 8-9.
110. (1990), 17 W.C.A.T.R. 64.
111. Ibid. at 76.
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The "Whole Person" Approach
The Tribunal has on several occasions adopted the "whole person" approach
as a method of overcoming the shortcomings of the Rating Schedule. The
Schedule is used by the Board in permanent disability awards to assess the
impairment of earning capacity due to the nature and degree of the worker's
injury. The percentages set out in the Schedule represent the Board's estimate
of the impairment of earning capacity in an average worker when the
disability exists alone in a healthy body. 112 However, the Rating Schedule is
sometimes not effective for assessing the impact of multiple disabilities upon
a worker. In such cases the "whole person" approach may be useful for
advocates in attempting to secure an award which most realistically reflects
the level of disability of the worker.
Perhapsthe clearest discussion of this principle is in Decision No. 427/90.113
There the panel noted that a combination of disabilities may impact upon the
worker to a greater degree than the total awards for each individual disability
would reflect, due to the interrelationship of the various disabilities. When
"the additive approach fails to reflect the full extent of the worker's compen-
sable disability as a whole person, then an enhancement factor is ap-
propriate". 114 In those cases the Tribunal should assess the total, whole
person disability of the worker in the context of the 'benchmark injuries' set
out in the Rating Schedule to determine where the worker's level of disability
fits, and make the award accordingly."
5
Obligation to Re-employ
This is the newest area of litigation for advocates working on behalf of injured
worker's 116 and the Tribunal has already given some consideration to the
procedural aspects of this obligation. Section 54b of the Act sets out the
112. For a discussion of the Board's policy see Decision No. 831188F (1990), 16
W.C.A.T.R. 26.
113. (March 27, 1991; Moore, Barbeau, Fox). The worker was represented by the Injured
Worker's Consultants legal clinic.
114. Ibid. at 17.
115. Ibid. For other case where the Tribunal has considered the "whole person" approach,
both positively and otherwise, see Decision No. 495/90 (October 31, 1990;
Starkmnan, Jago, McCombie), Decision No. 565189 (1990), 16 W.C.A.T.R. 121,
Decision No. 907/89 (March 27, 1991; Strachan, Ronson, Cook), Decision No. 79/91
(May 9, 1991; Bigras, Seguin, Beattie) and Decision No. 522/90 (May 13, 1991; Sig-
noroni, Jago, Cook).
116. In fact, the first decision of a Reinstatement Branch Officer is dated August 17, 1990.
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employer's obligation to re-employ an injured worker.117 It provides, inter
alia, that the Board must notify the employer of the worker's fitness to return
to work, and having been notified, the employer must offer to reinstate the
worker or face substantial financial penalties. In Decision No. 372191,118 the
Tribunal noted that the intent of the provisions is
... to accomplish swift and effective re-entry of an injured worker to his
former work place. They are remedial-intended to address the significant
social and economic dilemma of unemployability of injured workers.
119
In all such cases the threshold question which must be answered is whether
the obligation exists. In Decision Number 968/90120 the Tribunal stated that
section 54b(1) set out three prerequisites, which were:
(i) the worker must have suffered an injury covered by the Act;
(ii) the worker must have been unable to work as a result of the in-
jury; and
(iii) the worker must have been continuously employed by the
employer for one year before the accident. 1
21
If the obligation is found to exist, the Tribunal has stated that it only arises
when the Board has made its determination regarding the fitness of the
worker and has notified the employer of the results of that determination.
It is not sufficient that the worker has simply returned to work with the
accident employer for the obligation to arise. 1 22 However, the Tribunal
has also noted that the notice required to be given to the employer need
not be a "technical, formal document" but should be a "practical and
117. Section 54b(1) provides:
54b(1) The employer of a worker who as a result of an injury has been unable to
work and who, on the date of the injury, had been employed continuously for at least
one year by the employer shall offer to re-employ the worker in accordance with this
section.
118. (July 25, 1991; Newman, Meslin, Lebert). The worker was represented by the
Brampton Community Legal Clinic.
119. Ibid. at4.
120. (1991), 17 W.C.A.T.R. 334.
121. Ibid. at 346.
122. Supra, note 117 at 7-8. One of the issues in that case was whether the employer had
terminated the worker before having fulfilled its reinstatement obligation; see section
54b(10).
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effective method of communication". 123 Oral notice concerning the
worker's fitness is suitable to give rise to the employer's obligation. Once
the employer has received this notice of fitness, he is obliged to reinstate
the worker immediately, even if he disagrees with the Board's determina-
tion or intends to appeal the reinstatement. The employer is obliged to
'comply now, appeal later'. 124
4. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACT
Perhaps the single most important event in the unemployment insurance field
is that the amendments proposed to the Unemployment Insurance Act 125 by
Bill C-21 were finally passed. After a protracted struggle in the Senate most
provisions came into effect on November 18, 1990.126 The amendments were
viewed by advocates as an attempt by the federal government to reduce its
deficit, and it is feared that the effect of the amendments will be to increase
the caseload of poverty law practitioners, both in the area of unemployment
insurance and other poverty law areas.
Federal Government Withdrawal from Funding
The biggest change, and the one most probable to have long term effects, is
the withdrawal of the federal government as a contributing partner. 127 Pre-
viously, unemployment insurance had been funded by employer and
employee contributions and government contributions from general
revenues. The amendments removed the government's funding respon-
sibilities. This may effectively mean that the government will no longer have
any vested interest in controlling the scheme. With the entire program funded
by employer payrolls, there is a growing fear that employers will now request
greater input into its design and greater control over the distribution of
unemployment insurance funds, to the (probable?) detriment of those most
dependent upon the program.
123. Supra, note 119 at 350.
124. Supra, note 117 at 9.
125. R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1.
126. S.C. 1990, c. 40.
127. Ibid. s. 52 and 56(3).
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Parental Leave Benefits
As a result of the successful arguments made in the Schacter case,128 the parental
leave benefits provided by the Act have been extended to parents of both
new-born and adopted children. 129 However, the benefit period has been reduced
from 15 weeks to 10 weeks. The benefit period may be extended to 15 weeks if
the child is more than six months old at the time of arrival in the home and a
medical practitioner certifies that the child suffers fromsical, psychological or
emotional conditions requiring an additional period of parental care. As well, the
weeks of benefit may now be divided between the parents of the child.
Benefits Payable to Seniors
As a result of the Tetreault-Gadoury case 130 section 19 of the Act, which
prohibited the payment of benefits to applicants over the age of 65, was
repealed. 13
1
Definition of "Just Cause" for Leaving Employment
The amendments provide some guidelines for determining whether "just
cause" exists for voluntarily leaving an employment. Regard must be had to
all the circumstances including the existence of sexual or other harassment,
the obligation to follow a spouse or dependent child to another residence, the
existence of discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Code, work-
ing conditions which constitute a danger to health or safety and the obligation
to care for a child. 1
32
Labour Dispute Disentitlement
Prior to the amendments, this section provided that a person was not entitled
to benefits if he or she had lost their employment by reason of a stoppage of
work until the termination of the stoppage of work.133 To preempt the Federal
Court of Appeal's decision in Caron134 (and the Supreme Court's subsequent
128. Schachter v. The Queen et al (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 525 (F.C.T.D.), affd.,(1990), 66
D.L.R. (4th) 635 (F.C.A.).
129. Supra, note 125, s. 11 and 20.
130. Supra, note 3. For a discussion of this case, see below.
131. Supra, note 125, s. 13.
132. Supra, note 125, s. 21.
133. Supra, note 124, s. 31.
134. Caron v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1989] 1 F.C. 628
(F.C.A.), aff'd (1991), 47 Admin. L. R. 161 (S.C.C.). For a discussion of the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision, see below.
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affirmation of that decision) a regulation was enacted which deemed a labour
dispute to have ended when the work-force and level of production attained
85% of their normal level 135.
Restricted Benefits Payouts
The new amendments also increase the 'variable entrance requirements',
which is the number of weeks that claimants are required to work (based upon
the regional rate of unemployment) in order to qualify for benefits. Under
the old regime (and depending upon the regional rate of unemployment) a
claimant needed 10 to 14 weeks of work to qualify, with the 10 week
requirement applying where the regional rate of unemployment was over 9
per cent. Now a claimant will need between 10 and 20 weeks of insurable
employment in order to qualify, 136 with the regional rate of unemployment
to which the ten week requirement would apply greatly increased.
As well, the number of weeks for which benefits will be payable is decreased,
again based on the number of weeks of insurable employment and the
regional rate of unemployment.
137
Increased Penalties for Claimants
Before the amendments, if a claimant was deemed to have lost his or her job
by reason of 'misconduct', or to have left his or her employment 'without
just cause' or to have failed to accept 'suitable employment', he or she could
be disqualified from receiving benefits for a period of from 1 to 6 weeks.
Under the new scheme, the minimum period of disqualification for these
same actions is 7 weeks and the maximum period is 12 weeks. 138 Further,
once a disqualified claimant begins to finally receive benefits, the benefit
level will be reduced to 50 per cent of his or her average weekly insurable
earnings by reason of this disqualification, for a period of time which will be
determined by the Commission. 1
39
IMPACT OF THE NEW AMENDMENTS
While not all the new amendments to the Act are unwelcome, it is clear they
have had and will continue to have an impact on the work done by poverty
135. Unemployment Insurance Regulations Amendment, SOR/90-756, s. 13.
136. Supra, note 125, s. 5.
137. Ibi. s. 9.
138. Supra, note 125, s. 22.
139. Ibid.
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law advocates and practitioners. The continuing recession has meant that
more people have lost their jobs, resulting in a growing number of applicants
for unemployment insurance. The stricter qualification criteria and harsher
disqualification policies will likely lead to an increased amount of litigation
in these areas, requiring an increased amount of advocacy on behalf of
applicants. To the extent that this litigation is unsuccessful, it will mean that
claimants will be forced to turn to other social benefit programs for assis-
tance, with the most likely alternative being the provincial social assistance
scheme. Finally, the financial hardship which the impact of these amend-
ments will create for those most in need will require advocacy in other areas,
including tenancy, mortgage and consumer matters, perhaps only to forestall
the inevitable for a number of days or months.
CASELAW DEVELOPMENTS
While the legislative changes could certainly not be considered good news,
there were some successes in the judicial arena. As already mentioned, the
Supreme Court in Tetreault-Gadoury found the provision in the Act which
prohibited the payment of UI benefits to those over the age of 65 to be a
violation of the equality rights provision in the Charter.140 The Court also
reasoned that despite the alleged objectives put forward by the Commission
for this prohibition, it could not be saved by section 1 of the Charter.141 One
interesting point about the Court's decision, a point which may be useful in
future constitutional challenges to the unemployment insurance scheme, is
the observation that the overall objective of the Act "is to provide a temporary
sanctuary for those wishing to remain in the active labour force, but who are
unable for the moment, to find employment."'
142
The other unemployment insurance case to reach the Supreme Court was
Caron. At issue in that case was the entitlement to UI benefits of employees
who had not yet returned to work after the settlement of a labour dispute.
Section 44(1)(a) of the Act (as it then read) stated that such employees were
140. Supra, note 3 at 15. As it turned out the issue in this case became moot when the
federal government revoked s. 19 retroactive to the date of the Federal Court of
Appeal's decision in this case. However, the Supreme Court went on to consider the
issue because the revocation of s. 19 did not affect the position of those who had
turned 65 prior to this date.
141. Section 1 provides that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are subject
only to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society".
142. Supra, note 3 at 20.
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not entitled to benefits until the "termination of the stoppage of work". The
Supreme Court observed that nothing in the language of the section supported
the use of a particular level of production or the return to work of a certain
number of employees as indicative of the "termination of the stoppage of
work" and held that, in this case, such "termination" occurred with the
signing of the new collective agreement. 143 However, as noted above, the
Regulations now specifically set out when a "termination of the stoppage of
work" occurs.
A final case of note in this area is Canada (Attorney General) v. Enns.144 The
applicant was a minister who continued to work for his congregation during
time periods when they could not afford to pay him. The applicant had applied
for unemployment insurance benefits during these times when he was paid
no salary. The Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the applicant had a
'continuing contract of service' with the congregation (even though he was
not paid) and thus he did not have an 'interruption of earnings' as required
by the Act and Regulations1 45 and was therefore disqualified from receiving
benefits. The case is of importance because of the implications it has for
unemployment insurance applicants and beneficiaries who may be providing
unpaid, voluntary services to groups and organizations throughout the
country, and whose eligibility for benefits may for this reason be in jeopardy.
4. THE CANADA PENSION PLAN
Although the Canada Pension Plan146 is a lesser component of poverty law
practice than such programs as social assistance, workers' compensation and
unemployment insurance, it nevertheless forms a significant part of the
Canadian income security network. Certain aspects of the plan regularly raise
issues of concern for poverty law advocates, especially those involving
disability pensions and spousal entitlements under the plan.
143. Supra, note 133 at 167.
144. (September 17, 1990) Doc. No. A-559-89 (Federal Court of Appeal) [unreported];
leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada granted May 2, 1991. The applicant was
represented by the Sudbury Community Legal Clinic.
145. An 'interruption of earnings' is defined in section 37 of the Regulations under the
Act as "a period of seven or more consecutive days during which no work is per-
formed ... and in respect of which no earnings ... are payable or allocated".
146. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8, as amended [hereinafter CPP].
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AMENDMENTS TO THE APPEALS PROCESS
Amendments to the Act were passed in 1986, replacing the current "Review
Committee"-the first level of appeal from a decision of the Minister-with
a "Review Tribunal", panels of which would be drawn from a fixed roster
and would always be chaired by a lawyer. However, although regulations
have been gazetted for the implementation of this scheme, the amendments
have yet to be proclaimed in force. Health and Welfare officials have
suggested that with greater expertise at the review Tribunal level, decisions
at that level will be taken more seriously and there will be fewer Departmental
appeals to the Pension Appeals Board.
DISABILITY PENSIONS
The greatest volume of CPP work for poverty law advocates is with respect
to the provision of pensions to disabled contributors.147 One of the most
contentious issues here is the limitation period for applying for benefits.
Unlike retirement pensions and death benefits, eligibility for a disability
pension depends on a contributor's having established the prescribed con-
tributions within a certain time before the date of the onset of disability (the
"recency" requirement). 148 Since the onset of disability cannot be deemed to
have occurred more than 15 months prior to the date of an application for a
disability pension (the "retroactivity" provision), 149 the legislation effective-
ly provides a limitation period for claims. As a result of these rules many
people who may at one time have qualified for disability pensions are denied
because their applications are too late.
Advocates have long complained that these rules operate unfairly for many
claimants. Many people spend years struggling to overcome their problems
or to rehabilitate themselves before resigning themselves to accept the
"disabled" label. There is a rather cruel irony that the limitation period
effectively penalizes those who resist most strongly. For others, the failure
to apply for benefits is directly related to the particular problem which would
qualify them for benefits, especially in the case of mental disabilities. This
does not count the many people who do not apply simply because they are
not aware of the existence of the poorly publicized disability pensions.
147. CPP s.44(1)(b) allows for provision of a pension to a person with the requisite con-
tributory period who is determined to be suffering from a "severe and prolonged
mental or physical disability".
148. CPP. s.44(2).
149. CPP. s.42(2)(b).
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There were two unsuccessful Charter challenges to the disability pension
limitation period in the past year. In Moses-Brown150 the Pension Appeals
Board (P.A.B.) refused to consider a Charter argument where the appellant
had become mentally disabled prior to the coming into force of the Charter
and who did not meet the contributory period requirements at that time.
Although the contributory period requirements had subsequently changed the
new provisions could not be applied retroactively and nothing in the Charter
affected this.
In Kartisch,151 the claimant would have qualified for a disability pension in
1981 but did not become aware of the availability of disability benefits until
1985. The P.A.B. summarily dismissed a s.15 argument on the grounds that
this would have involved a retrospective application of the Charter. The
Board Went on to reject an argument based on s.7 of the Charter, holding that
the right to a pension was a purely economic right which did not fall within
the scope of "life, liberty and security of the person, protected by s.7, a point
on which s.7 jurisprudence to date is virtually unanimous".
152
On May 24, 1991, Health and Welfare Canada released a study of the recency
and retroactivity rules which recommended that an exception to the recency
and retroactivity rules should be made for persons whose disability itself
prevented them from making a timely application for benefits. It also recom-
mended that Health and Welfare undertake a public information campaign to
better publicize pension availability. However, it concluded that the recency
and retroactivity rules of the plan should otherwise be maintained.
The recommendations of the Departmental study will probably not satisfy
the advocacy community. Many still question the justification of recency
requirements for disability pensions when there are none for other kinds of
pensions under the same legislation. While challenges to these rules were
unsuccessful in Moses-Brown and Kartisch, this was because the Board
refused to apply the Charter retroactively; the main s.15 issues have still not
been judicially considered. However, it may be significant for future litiga-
tion activities in this area that in Kartisch the majority of the Board went on
150. Deborah Moses-Brown v. Minister of National Health and Welfare (1990), C.E.B. &
P.G.R. # 8615.
151. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Edward Kartisch (1991), C.E.B. &
P.G.R. # 8625.
152. For further discussion of this issue, see Ian Morrison, "Poverty Law and the Charter:
The Year In Review" (1990), 6 J.L. & Social Pol'y 1.
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to find, although this was not necessary to its decision, that the effective
limitation period for making claims was reasonable and fair, stating that to give
effect to the claimant's arguments "might well result in having benefits paid
without any real relation in time and volume to the contributions made". Thus,
even if a s.15 violation can be established in relation to these rules, it seems that
the Board has already outlined the s.1 issues that must be confronted.
SPOUSAL BENEFITS
Another problem area of the Canada Pension Plan is the set of issues arising
around spousal entitlements, such as division of unadjusted pensionable
earnings and survivor's benefits. Because women generally make less money
than men and therefore have lower contributory rates, or have no contribu-
tions because they have been occupied as homemakers for all or part of their
marriages, the rules governing access to spouses' or former spouses' pension
entitlements are particularly important for poor women. Unfortunately, these
rules are also complicated, confusing and difficult to apply.
Division of Pension Credits
The CPP Act provides that upon dissolution of marriage the pension credits
earned by the contributions of one spouse can be split between the spouses. This
provision is particularly important for women who were occupied as
homemakers during the marriage and thus did not make contributions to the Plan.
For several years Health and Welfare advised the legal profession and the
public that the right to apply for a division of unadjusted pensionable earnings
was not affected by separation agreements or divorce unless specifically
mentioned in the agreement or order. Unfortunately for the many people who
relied on this advice, the P.A.B. in 1983 held that a general release of all
property claims in a property settlement would operate to release all claims
to division of CPP credits as well. 153 While the Act was subsequently
amended to reinstate the old rule for settlements entered into after June 4,
1986, this amendment did not operate retroactively. This year the govern-
ment-apparently responding to media pressure and threats of litigation 154-
finally amended the CPP Act155 to give the Minister the power to rectify a
153. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Lawrence Preece (1983), C.E.B. &
P.G.R. # 8914.
154. E.g., see L. Shifrin, "Ottawa's bungling cheats divorcees" The Toronto Star (29 Oc-
tober 1990) A21.
155. Bill C-260, Royal Assent Feb. 1, 1991; in force March 15, 1991.
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denial of benefits or division of unadjusted pensionable earnings resulting
from the Preece ruling, for separation agreements or judicial orders prior to
June 4, 1986.
On another credit-splitting issue, the P.A'B. dismissed a Charter s.15 chal-
lenge to the Act's requirement that an application for division of unadjusted
pensionable earnings must be made within 36 months of the date of a decree
absolute of divorce, 15 6 holding that even if the application of the limitation
period disproportionately affected women-which was not shown in
evidence-the rule was not discriminatory.
157
Common Law Spouses, the Charter and the CPP
In its attempts to define relationship outside of marriage as "spousal"
relationship for various purposes, the CPP Act gives rise to many problems
and often unfair results. Not surprisingly, some advocates have tried to
challenge these spousal definitions, but with only limited success to date.
In Mosher158 the P.A.B. rejected s.15 challenge to the definition of spouse
contained in the then s.64(2)(b) of the Plan. The claimant had an intimate
relationship with a CPP contributor for almost three years but did not move
in with him until her son, who had been living with her, left home. The
contributor died ten months later. The claimant's application for survivor's
benefits was rejected because they had not cohabited for at least one year, as
required by the section. McQuaid J.A., for the majority, held that marital
status was not a personal characteristic analogous to those enumerated in
s.15, as required by the Andrews159 test. He held that marital status was
"voluntarily assumed"1 60 and that s.15 did not bar discrimination on the basis
of such characteristics-it seems the claimant was out of luck for not having
demanded that the contributor "make an honest woman of her". Macintosh
J., in a strong dissent, noted that marital status had been accepted as a
prohibited ground of discrimination in a number of cases. With respect to the
claimant's "choice" to remain unmarried to the contributor, he stated: "Such
156. CPP s.55.
157. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Ivadell Cornell (Apr. 18, 1991), Appeal:
CP2108 (Pension Appeals Board) [unreported].
158. Minister of NationalHealth and Welfare v. Linda Mosher (1990), C.E.B. & P.G.R. # 8616.
159. Andrews v. Law Society ofBritish Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
160. See Morrison, "Poverty Law and The Charter: The Year in Review", supra, note 151
at 24 for further discussion of "voluntary status" in social welfare Charter litigation.
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a choice is perfectly lawful and affects no one but themselves. Surely there
is a right in a free and democratic society to exercise such a choice without
penalty". In view of the clear intention expressed by the contributor in his
will to provide for the claimant, he would have in effect granted a constitu-
tional exemption to the one year cohabitation requirement.
Although Mosher is the only P.A.B. decision on this issue, it may be noted
that the Charter has been used successfully in at least one case involving the
Plan's spousal definition. In a case which arose prior to the coming into force
of s.15 of the Charter, a Review Committee held that the Act violated s.2(b)
of the Charter (freedom of expression) by its requirement that the claimant
was "publicly represented" to be the spouse of the deceased contributor. 161
After a considerable amount of media attention to the case, the government
abandoned an appeal to the P.A.B. 162
DISABLED CONTRIBUTORS' CHILDREN'S BENEFITS
One final litigation victory is worth noting here, although on an issue of less
overall importance to the low income community than disability pensions
and pension splitting.
The Plan provides for a special benefit to be paid to the children of disabled
contributors. 163 This benefit is available to both legally and factually adopted
children where the adoption took place before the onset of disability. How-
ever, the benefit is not available in respect of factually adopted children where
the adoption takes place after the onset of disability.164 In Blais165 the PAB
held this year that this rule violated s.15 of the Charter. It is interesting to
note that McQuaid J.A. and Macintosh J., who wrote the majority and
dissenting judgments respectively in Mosher, supra, were again on the panel.
This time however McQuaid J.A. was left in dissent (again arguing that
family status is not an analogous ground for the purposes of s.15 because it
161. Ibid., at 9.
162. Decision of Pension Appeals Board Nov. 13, 1990 (Consent). See also Slinger, "Ottawa
gives up on persecuting Olive" The Toronto Star (11 November 1990) A2. The claimant
was represented by Kensington Bellwoods Community Legal Services, Toronto.
163. CPP s.44(1)(e).
164. CPP s.74(4).
165. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Armand Blais (April 26, 1991), Appeal:
CP1982 (Pension Appeals Board) [unreported]. The claimant was represented by
Kinna-aweya Legal Clinic, Thunder Bay.
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is a legal status voluntarily chosen). Smith J., writing for himself and
Macintosh J., expressly rejected McQuaid J.A.'s approach and declined to
follow Mosher.
CONCLUSION
While the areas of poverty law practice which this article has focused on are
diverse, containing a myriad of administrative and legislative requirements,
some themes common to them all have arisen. The most positive event was
the election of a New Democratic government in Ontario, in light of that
party's longstanding support of social benefit programs. Less fortunately, but
no less important, the effects of the recession on people of low income (and
their advocates) have been disastrous. An equally disastrous occurrence has
been the federal government's implicit and explicit attacks on social spending
in this country.
Each of these issues has had important consequences for the work of advo-
cates in the poverty law area. As was noted above, the most positive was the
election result in Ontario. The new government moved quickly and with
increased urgency on issues such as social assistance reform. There were
administrative changes also, such as the new appointments at the Worker's
Compensation Board, intended to make the social welfare bureaucracy some-
what more responsive to the needs and concerns of those it was meant to
assist. In some measure, this impetus was also reflected in the decision-
making process under the income maintenance programs reviewed.
However, many of the advances hoped for were forestalled by the ravaging
effects of the recession. The economic downturn resulted in an increase in
the number of jobs lost and forced more people than ever to seek aid from
the unemployment insurance program. The number of people on social
assistance also skyrocketed as the recession deepened and a growing number
of people either exhausted their UI entitlement or did not qualify at all. This
placed an immense strain on the budgets of the provinces and the
municipalities who were responsible for the delivery of these programs. In
some cases the focus became stemming the tide.
These events occurred at a time when, as we have observed, the federal
government was intent on reducing the size of its own deficit in part by
reneging on its past commitment to the funding of social welfare schemes.
While its 'tightening up' of the unemployment insurance program forced
more people in need to seek social assistance, the federal government also
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reduced the amount of money available to the provinces and municipalities
to fund the social welfare schemes through its 'cap on CAP'.
It is against the background of these events that our review of the past year's
developments in some of the key areas of poverty law must be viewed.
Advocates for the low income community have played a commendable role,
both in litigation and law reform, in attempting to prevent a bad situation
from getting worse. It would seem that in the present economic and political
climate poverty law practitioners will be forced to continue to advocate, not
for improvements in the income maintenance programs so vital to their
clients, but simply to protect the status quo. To do so, it will be necessary to
use all the weapons at our disposal, including the Charter of Rights. It is
hoped that this article has served to highlight some of the previous successes
in this regard and to indicate what may lay ahead.
